Abstract. Norde et al. [Games Econ. Behav. 12 (1996) 219] proved that none of the equilibrium concepts in the literature on equilibrium selection in finite strategic games satisfying existence is consistent. A transition to set-valued solution concepts overcomes the inconsistency problem:
Introduction
The notion of consistency for solutions of noncooperative games was introduced by and . Consistency essentially requires that if a nonempty set of players commits to playing according to a certain solution, the remaining players in the reduced game should not have an incentive to deviate from it either. This appears to be a minimal requirement on a solution concept (see also Aumann, 1987, pp. 478-479) : given that others play the game according to a certain solution, the solution concept should recommend you to do the same.
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valued 2 solution concept for the set of strategic games satisfying consistency, in combination with standard utility maximizing behavior in one-player games and nonemptiness, is the Nash equilibrium concept. In particular, none of the concepts from the extensive equilibrium refinement literature satisfying nonemptiness is consistent. As Aumann states in an interview (van Damme, 1998, p. 204) , this is something to "chalk up against selection theory". Also Barry O'Neill (2004, p. 215 ) calls this a "surprising result" which "seems to challenge the whole project" of equilibrium refinement: "It seems hard for refinement advocates to dismiss consistency, since it is so close to the basic rationale for the Nash equilibrium". Dufwenberg et al. (2001) show by means of examples that a transition to set-valued solution concepts overcomes the inconsistency problem: there is a multiplicity of consistent set-valued solution concepts that satisfy nonemptiness and recommend utility maximization in one-player games. The minimal curb sets of Basu and Weibull (1991) constitute one such a solution concept. Minimal curb sets are of central importance in the literature on strategic adjustment, since many intuitively appealing adjustment processes eventually settle down in a minimal curb set; cf. Hurkens (1995) , Young (1998), and Fudenberg and Levine (1998) .
Building on the papers cited earlier, which strive for characterizations of existing solution concepts in terms of consistency and other properties or axioms, we provide a similar axiomatization of minimal curb sets. Section 2 contains definitions and notation. Section 3 describes properties of set-valued solution concepts. It is shown that the set-valued solution concept that assigns to each game its collection of minimal curb sets satisfies these properties (Prop. 3.1); indeed, it is the only one (Thm. 4.1). Moreover, the properties are logically independent (Prop. 4.2).
Section 5 contains variants and extensions of the main result.
Notation and definitions
Weak set inclusion is denoted by ⊆, proper set inclusion by ⊂. A game is a tuple G = N, (A i ) i∈N , (u i ) i∈N , where N is a nonempty, finite set of players, each player i ∈ N has a nonempty, finite set of pure strategies (or actions) A i and a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
The set of all games is denoted by Γ. The subgame obtained from G by restricting the action set of each player i ∈ N to a subset X i ⊆ A i is 2 A point-valued solution concept assigns to each game a collection of strategy profiles, i.e., a set of points in the strategy space of the game. A set-valued solution concept assigns to each game a collection of product sets of strategies, i.e., a set of product sets in the strategy space of the game. Set-valued solution concepts include:
the set of rationalizable strategies (Bernheim, 1984) , persistent retracts (Kalai and Samet, 1984) , minimal curb sets (Basu and Weibull, 1991) , and minimal prep sets (Voorneveld, 2004 (Voorneveld, , 2005 . Also in cooperative game theory such set-valued solutions arise. A familiar example is the solution concept that assigns to each transferable utility game its possibly empty collection of von Neumann and Morgenstern stable sets; see Osborne and Rubinstein (1994, Section 14 .2) for a textbook treatment.
denoted -with a minor abuse of notation from restricting the domain of the payoff functions u i 
is the set of pure best responses of player i against α −i .
A set-valued solution concept ϕ on Γ is a correspondence that assigns to each game
A curb set (Basu and Weibull, 1991 ; 'curb' is mnemonic for 'closed under rational behavior')
responses of player i against his belief:
A curb set X is minimal if no curb set is a proper subset of X. The set-valued solution concept that assigns to each game its collection of minimal curb sets is denoted by min-curb. Hence, for
min-curb(G) = {X ⊆ A : X is a minimal curb set of G}.
Similarly,
We occasionally refer to minimal prep sets (Voorneveld, 2004 ; 'prep' is short for 'preparation').
A prep set of G is a nonempty product set X = × i∈N X i ⊆ A such that for each i ∈ N and each belief α −i ∈ × j∈N \{i} ∆(X j ) of player i, the set X i contains at least one best response of player i against his belief:
A prep set X is minimal if no prep set is a proper subset of X. The set-valued solution concept that assigns to each game its collection of minimal prep sets is denoted by min-prep. Hence, for
min-prep(G) = {X ⊆ A : X is a minimal prep set of G}.
Example 2.1 In the two-player game G in Figure 
Properties of set-valued solution concepts
We provide properties of set-valued solution concepts and show that min-curb satisfies these properties. Variants are discussed in Section 5. Throughout this section, ϕ is an arbitrary set-valued solution concept on Γ. The first three properties are well-known from , , and Norde et al. (1996) for point-valued solutions like the Nash equilibrium concept and are simply restated for set-valued solution concepts. Nonemptiness requires that the solution concept assigns to each game a nonempty collection of solutions. Oneperson rationality requires that in one-player games, the solution simply consists of the set of utility maximizers.
One-person rationality: for each one-player game
The idea behind consistency is that if some players commit to playing according to a certain solution, the remaining players should have an incentive to do so too. This requires appropriate ways to model: (a) the reduced game that arises if some players commit to a certain behavior, (b) the absence of incentives to deviate, i.e., the statement that the solution of the original game gives rise to a solution of the reduced game.
Different models of these issues yield different forms of consistency. In this article we use the notion of reduced games as defined by , , and Norde et al. (1996) : Given a game G = N, (A i ) i∈N , (u i ) i∈N ∈ Γ with at least two players and a mixed strategy profile α ∈ × i∈N ∆(A i ), fix a coalition S ⊂ N, S = ∅, and suppose that the players in N \ S commit to playing their part of α. The reduced game w.r.t. S and α is the game
where only players i ∈ S choose from their set of pure strategies has a solution in × j∈S X j , the relevant part of X ∈ ϕ(G).
The other properties are specific for set-valued solution concepts, but remain standard.
Many common set-valued solution concepts satisfy nonnestedness, including those defined by product sets of actions which: (a) survive some iterated elimination process, for instance of strictly/weakly dominated actions, or, in the case of rationalizability, of never-best replies, or (b) are minimal or maximal sets with some desirable property, including persistent retracts (socalled minimal absorbing retracts, see Kalai and Samet, 1984, pp. 134-135) , minimal curb/prep sets, the product set of all minimax/maximin actions in two-person zero-sum games, the product set of all rationalizable actions (the so-called maximal tight curb set, see Basu and Weibull, 1991, p. 145) , or the largest consistent set of Chwe (1994, pp. 313-318 ; his use of the word 'consistent' is unrelated to our notion of consistency).
The next property, satisfaction, is a simple revealed-preference property. A product set of strategies is called satisfactory, given the solution concept ϕ, if players can credibly commit to playing actions from that set if they believe that others do so: it always contains a solution of the associated reduced game. Given such credible commitment, satisfaction 3 states that a way of finding solutions of the original game is to solve the subgame restricted to a satisfactory set.
Formally, consider a game G ∈ Γ with at least two players and a product set X = × i∈N X i ⊆ A.
Such a set is called satisfactory under ϕ if for each α ∈ × i∈N ∆(X i ) and each S ⊂ N, S = ∅,
This property is reminiscent of the converse consistency axiom of and , which roughly states that if a solution candidate always yields a solution in the associated reduced games, it is indeed a solution of the original game. Note that satisfaction is much weaker: satisfactory sets need not be contained in the solution of the game. Proof. Nonemptiness: Let G ∈ Γ. As the entire strategy space A is a curb set, the collection of curb sets is nonempty, finite and partially ordered by set inclusion. Consequently, a minimal curb set of G exists.
One-person rationality: Let G = {i}, A i , u i ∈ Γ be a one-player game. In a one-player game, the set of best responses is simply the set of maximizers of the utility function. Hence,
is a curb set of G if and only if arg max
it is a minimal curb set of G if and
and Nonnestedness: Holds by minimality.
We first show that X ∈ curb(G). Let i ∈ N and α ∈ × j∈N ∆(X j ). Since X is a satisfactory set under min-curb, there is a Y ∈ min-curb(G {i},α ) with Y ⊆ X i . But G {i},α is the one-player
, X i contains all best replies to the belief α −i ∈ × j∈N \{i} ∆(X j ). Since this holds for arbitrary i ∈ N and α ∈ × j∈N ∆(X j ), it holds by definition that X ∈ curb(G).
We now prove (1) by contradiction:
contradicting that Y ∈ min-curb(G ). Conclude that (1) holds.
Axiomatization
In this section, we show that min-curb is the unique solution concept satisfying the properties in Section 3 and that these properties are logically independent. Proof. Proposition 3.1 shows that min-curb satisfies the properties. Let ϕ be a set-valued solution concept on Γ that also satisfies them. To show:
We do so by induction on the number of players. In a one-player game G = {i},
follows from one-person rationality of ϕ and min-curb that
Next, let n ∈ N and assume that ϕ and min-curb coincide on all games in Γ with at most n players. Let G = N, (A i ) i∈N , (u i ) i∈N ∈ Γ have n + 1 players.
Step 1: ϕ(G) ⊆ curb(G). 
Let X ∈ ϕ(G), i ∈ N , and α
i.e., the unique solution of the reduced game G {i},β is the set of best replies of i in the game G against the belief α −i :
as we had to show.
Step 2: If X ∈ min-curb(G), then X is a satisfactory set under ϕ.
Let X ∈ min-curb(G), α ∈ × i∈N ∆(X i ), and S ⊂ N, S = ∅. By induction, ϕ(G S,α ) = min-curb(G S,α ). By consistency of min-curb, there is a Y ∈ min-curb(G S,α ) with Y ⊆ × i∈S X i .
Combining these two results, we find that there is a Y ∈ ϕ(G S,α ) with Y ⊆ × i∈S X i . Hence, X is a satisfactory set under ϕ.
Step 3:
Let X ∈ min-curb(G). By
Step 2, X is a satisfactory set under ϕ. Since ϕ satisfies nonemptiness and satisfaction, it follows that
So let Y ∈ ϕ( N, (X i ) i∈N , (u i ) i∈N ). Then Y ⊆ X, and by (2): Y ∈ ϕ(G).
Step 4:
and X, Z ∈ ϕ(G), we have a contradiction with the assumption that ϕ is nonnested. Conclude that X ∈ min-curb(G).
Step 5: min-curb(G) ⊆ ϕ(G).
Let X ∈ min-curb(G). By Step 3, there is a Y ⊆ X with Y ∈ ϕ(G). By Step 1, Y ∈ curb(G).
Since X ∈ min-curb(G) and Y ⊆ X is a curb set, it follows that Y = X, i.e., X = Y ∈ ϕ(G).
Combining Steps 4 and 5, conclude that ϕ(G) = min-curb(G) also for the (n + 1)-player
Proposition 4.2 The axioms in Theorem 4.1 are logically independent.
We show this by means of five set-valued solution concepts, each violating exactly one of the five axioms in Theorem 4.1. Since the verification that these concepts satisfy the given properties proceeds along the same lines as the proof of Proposition 3.1, we only show explicitly which axiom is violated. Solution concepts ϕ 1 to ϕ 5 are defined, for each game
as follows:
The solution concept ϕ 1 satisfies all properties in Theorem 4.1, except nonemptiness: ϕ 1 (G) = ∅ for each game G ∈ Γ with two or more players.
The solution concept ϕ 2 satisfies all properties in Theorem 4.1, except one-person rationality:
in the one-player game G = {1}, {a, b}, u 1 with u 1 (a) = u 1 (b), we have
The solution concept ϕ 3 satisfies all properties in Theorem 4.1, except consistency: in the game G in Figure 2 , we have X = {T } × {R} ∈ ϕ 3 (G). Consider the belief (T, R) in which player 1 chooses T with probability one and player 2 chooses R with probability one. In the 
Variants and extensions
(a) In Theorem 4.1, nonnestedness can be replaced by the following property:
The intuition behind decisiveness is that the solution concept takes some argument to its logical conclusion: given a solution X of a game, the solution of the subgame restricted to X is not refined further. Note that min-curb satisfies decisiveness. Nonnestedness is used only in Step 4 of Theorem 4.1, the proof of which now becomes as follows: Let X ∈ ϕ(G).
By
Step 3 applied to the subgame N,
Step 4.
The set-valued solution concepts ϕ 1 to ϕ 5 can be used to show that the new axiom system, with decisiveness instead of nonnestedness, uses logically independent properties; see Figure 5 for a summary.
(b) Since most of the literature on minimal curb sets involves mixed extensions of finite strategic games, we took this to be our domain Γ. This finiteness assumption is not necessary: we essentially need Γ to be closed w.r.t. certain subgames and reduced games, and that each game in Γ has a nonempty collection of minimal curb sets. In particular, defining curb sets and the properties in Section 3 in terms of product sets X = × i∈N X i where each component X i is a nonempty compact set of pure strategies, our analysis carries through also on the domain of games where each strategy space is assumed to be compact in some Euclidean space and utility functions are continuous, the domain on which Basu and Weibull (1991) establish existence of minimal curb sets.
(c) Rationality requires decision makers in one-player games to choose utility maximizing actions. That is the motivation behind the standard one-person rationality axiom in the consistency literature. For set-valued solution concepts, it plays a role whether one pools the utility maximizers within a single set or considers them separately. For instance, in the oneplayer game G = {1}, {a, b}, u 1 with u 1 (a) = u 1 (b), we have min-curb(G) = {{a, b}}, whereas min-prep(G) = {{a}, {b}}: curb sets require all 'best replies' to be present, prep sets require the presence of at least one. An intuitive modification of the one-person rationality axiom in Section 3 would therefore be:
Rewriting our earlier results yields an axiomatization of min-prep: The proofs are virtually identical to those of Propositions 3.1, 4.2, and Theorem 4.1 by interchanging, firstly, curb and prep and, secondly, min-curb and min-prep. They are therefore omitted.
In analogy with the remark under (a), nonnestedness can be replaced with decisiveness; the axioms remain logically independent.
(d) Basu and Weibull (1991) briefly consider socalled minimal curb * sets, a 'cautious' variant of minimal curb sets in which players are assumed to abstain from choosing weakly dominated actions.
Formally, let G = N, (A i ) i∈N , (u i ) i∈N ∈ Γ, let i ∈ N , and let a i ∈ A i . Recall that a i is weakly dominated if there is a mixed strategy
for each a −i ∈ × j∈N \{i} A j , with strict inequality for some a −i . The set of actions of player i that are not weakly dominated (sometimes referred to as admissible) is denoted by A * i . A curb * set of G is a nonempty product set X = × i∈N X i ⊆ A such that for each i ∈ N and each belief α −i ∈ × j∈N \{i} ∆(X j ) of player i, the set X i contains all admissible best responses of player i against his belief:
A curb * set X is minimal if no curb * set is a proper subset of X. The set-valued solution concept that assigns to each game its collection of minimal curb * sets is denoted by min-curb * .
Hence, for each game
min-curb
It is easily verified that min-curb * satisfies nonemptiness, one-person rationality, and nonnestedness. All other axioms, however, are violated. The main reason for this is that the weak dominance relation may change if one goes from the original game to reduced games or subgames; for instance, an action that is admissible in the original game may be weakly dominated in a reduced game. This indicates intuitively that consistency may be violated; we show this formally below and also indicate violations of satisfaction and decisiveness.
The solution concept min-curb * does not satisfy consistency: in the game G in Figure 3 we have X = {T, B} × {L} ∈ min-curb * (G). Consider the belief (B, L) in which player 1 chooses B with probability one and player 2 chooses L with probability one. In the reduced game 
